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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 78A-4-103(2)U).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the Trial Court correctly limit the trial to the issue of right of

possession of the property after the Trial Court dismissed the Appellant's Counterclaim
alleging that Respondent did not have an ownership interest in the property and could not
evict Appellant?
This issue presents a question of law and should be reviewed for correctness.
Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2012 UT 29, ,r 10,232 P.3d 999.
2.

Did the Trial Court correctly and within the scope of its authority deny

Appellant's Rule 26 Motion for discovery sanctions based on the expedited nature of the
unlawful detainer proceeding and based on the lack of substantial harm to Appellant?
This issue presents a question of law and should be reviewed for correctness.
Harris v. IES Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App 112, ,r 25, 69 P.3d 297.
COUNTER STATEMENT OF DETERMINITIVE PROVISIONS

The following statutory provision is determinative, Utah Code§ 78B-6-802.5,
Unlawful detainer after foreclosure or forced sale:
A previous owner, truster, or mortgagor of a property is guilty of unlawful
detainer if the person: (1) defaulted on his or her obligations resulting in
disposition of the property by a trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and (2)
continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale
after being served with a notice to quit by the purchaser.

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Statement of the Facts
On June 5, 2004, Appellant William York, Jr., ("Appellant") borrowed the sum of

$264,000 from Ameriquest Mortgage Company, as Beneficiary ("Ameriquest").

(R.

836.) On June 5, 2004, Appellant, as Trustor, executed and delivered to Tania Williams,
as Trustee, and Ameriquest, as Beneficiary, a Trust Deed to secure the performance of
Appellant's obligations under the Trust Deed Note ("Note"). (R. 2.) The Trust Deed
secured the real property situated in Millard County, Utah located at 4500 South 925
East, Delta, 84624 (the "Property"). (R. 2.) The Trust Deed was subsequently transferred
to Deutsche Banlc National Trust Company, as Trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage
Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R8, Under the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated August 1, 2004. (R. 258.)
Appellant defaulted on his obligation to perform pursuant to the terms of the Trust
Deed and Note. (R. 2.) On December 29, 2010, a Notice of Default and Election to Sell
was recorded in the Millard County Recorder's Office. (R. 2.) On February 23, 2012,
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities,
Inc., Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-R8 ("Respondent") purchased
the Property at the Trustee's sale for $176,000. (R. 2; R. 6-9.)
On February 23, 2012, Appellant became Respondent's tenant-at-will. (R. 2.) On
March 11, 2012, Respondent caused a Notice to Quit to be served on Appellant (R. 3; R.
11-14.) The Notice to Quit informed Appellant that Respondent elected to terminate the
tenancy at will and notified Appellant that his failure to vacate the Property within five
2

days would result in Appellant's unlawful detainer. (R. 3; R. 11-14.) Appellant failed to
vacate or turn over possession of the Property to Respondent. (R. 3.)
II.

Statement of the Procedural History

A.

Appellant Unsuccessfully Challenged the Foreclosure in a Subsequent
Eviction Action and in a Federal Action Filed by Appellant

On March 26, 2012, because Appellant failed to vacate or tum over possession of
the Property to Respondent, Respondent filed the instant unlawful detainer action seeking
/"·.

lo:i.l

an order and judgment requiring Appellant to vacate the Property (the "Complaint" and
the "Eviction Action"). (R.1-13.)
On April 3, 2012, Appellant filed a complaint in the United States District Court

Q

for the District of Utah under Case No. 12CV318 ("Federal Complaint" and "Federal
Action.") (R. 140; R. 158-272.)

The Federal Complaint was confusing and largely

unintelligible, containing general attacks on the mortgage industry, cut and pasted links to
Y ouTube videos, and unsubstantiated references to "scams" and fraud that Appellant
claimed occurred in connection with the securitization and subsequent assignment of the
loan in question. (R. 158-272.) The exhibits consisted of approximately 73 pages of what
appeared to be copy & pasted news articles and excerpts from the Utah Civil and

G;

Criminal Code. (R. 59 -117; R. 118-132.) Yet, notably, in the Federal Complaint,
Appellant acknowledged that he defaulted on the Note in 2010. (R. 51 & R. 188.)
On April 27, 2012, Appellant filed an answer to the Complaint in the Eviction
Action. (R. 15-17.) Then, on May 1, 2012, Appellant filed a 38-page "Counter Claim-

3
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Civil Complaint" ("Counterclaim") which was identical to the Federal Complaint filed on
April 3, 2012. (R. 21-132; R. 158-272.)
On July 11, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the Eviction Action
Counterclaim for failure to state a cause of action based on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (R.
136-138), a memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss (R. 139-157), and one
exhibit, which was a copy of the Federal Complaint.
On August 17, 2012, the Federal Complaint was dismissed with prejudice due to
Appellant's failure to meet the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and failure to
state a cause of action based on Fed. R. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). (R. 327.) It was also dismissed
based on Appellant's admission at a July 31, 2012 Federal Court hearing, that his own
complaint was facially deficient and failed to state a claim. (R. 327.) The Federal Court
further noted that an amendment of the pleadings would be futile and denied Appellant's
oral motion for an amendment. (R. 328-329.)
On August 23, 2012, in the Eviction Action, Respondent filed a request for
judicial notice pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 201 (b), requesting that the Fourth
Judicial District Court, Millard County (the "Trial Court"), take judicial notice of the
Federal Court order dismissing Appellant's identical Federal Complaint. (R. 323-330.)
On August 27, 2012, the Trial Court, deciding Respondent's July 11, 2012 motion
to dismiss, dismissed the Eviction Action Counterclaim for several reasons including that
identical issues were already ruled on in Federal Court and decided on the merits, and
because the Counterclaim failed to meet the minimum pleading standards Utah R. Civ. P.

4

Rule 8(a) generally, for fraud allegations pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 9(b), and for
failure to state a cause of action pursuant to12(b)(6). (R. 334.)
B.

Appellant Unsuccessfully Attempted to Amend His Counterclaim and
to File a Third Party Complaint

On September 4, 2012, without leave of court as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a),
Appellant filed an Amended Counter Claim-Civil Complaint ("Amended Counterclaim.")
in the Eviction Action. (R. 353 - 513.) On September 9, 2012, Respondent filed a
motion to strike the Amended Counterclaim (R. 519-521) and a memorandum in support
of the motion. (R. 522-528.) Respondent moved to strike on the basis that the Amended
Counterclaim was filed without leave of court, sought to add a third party complaint

Q

without leave of court, was redundant and immaterial. (R. 520.)
On October 1, 2012, the Trial Court held that the September 4, 2012 Amended

r·\

~

Counterclaim failed to satisfy the pleading standards of both Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a) and
Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b) and dismissed Appellant's Amended Counterclaim as to Respondent
only, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (R. 560-561.)
Then, on October 15, 20121, the Trial Court issued an order striking Appellant's
September 4, 2012 Amended Counterclaim. (R. 592-593.) By the same order, the Trial
Court dismissed Appellant's May 1, 2012 Counterclaim based on lack of personal
jurisdiction for Appellant's failure to serve the other Counterclaim defendants (R. 592593.) The Trial Court held that Appellant" ... failed to obtain leave of the court prior to filing his 'Counter ClaimCivil Complaint (Amended)'; the pleading includes no new factual
1

The Order was issued on October 15, 2012 but entered on November 19, 2012. (R.592.)
5

Q

allegations or causes of action that were not address[ ed] by the Federal
Court; and, the pleading improperly seeks to create a Third-Party
Complaint without leave of the court ... as to all other named and unnamed
parties."
(R. 592-593.)

The Trial Court held that Appellant's time to serve the

Counterclaim expired and Appellant failed to seek an extension of time for service and
therefore, pursuant to Utah Rule Civ. P. 4(b)(l), the Appellant's first Counterclaim, filed
on May 1, 2012, was dismissed as to all parties not previously dismissed2 . (R. 593.)
C.

Appellant Sought to Vacate the Trial Date based on Discovery
Issues Raised for the First Time on the Eve of Trial

On October 24, 2012, the Trial Court noticed a bench trial for November 21, 2012
before District Court Judge James Brady, the same Judge who decided the previous two
Trial Court motions to dismiss and/or strike.

(R.572-573.) On November 8, 2012,

Respondent filed a Motion for Appearance of Witness by Telephone (R. 574-577.) On
November 13, 2012, Respondent filed a Certificate of Mailing/Certificate of Service of
its trial exhibits. (R. 578-579.) On November 13, 2012, the Trial Court ordered that any
documents [Respondent] intended to produce for trial must be provided to witnesses and
to Appellant seven calendar days prior to the unlawful detainer trial. (R. 581.)

In this order, the Trial Court recognized that Respondent was previously dismissed as to
the May 1, 2012 Counterclaim as a result of Respondent's July 11, 2012 motion to
dismiss the Counterclaim. (R. 593.) However, at the time of Respondent's July 11, 2012
motion, none of the other counterclaim defendants had been served or had moved to
dismiss and were therefore, not officially dismissed from the Counterclaim until October
15, 2012.
2

6

On November 16, 2012, Appellant filed a motion to vacate the trial date. (R. 587589.) Appellant alleged that none of the defendants 3 timely responded to Appellant's

GJ

Amended Counterclaim. (R. 588.) He further alleged that there was never a scheduling
conference, any discovery, depositions or other preparations as "normally required before
a trial is scheduled." (R. 588.) He also claimed there were several undecided motions
that might not be decided until after the scheduled trial date. (R. 588.)
On November 21, 2012, the parties appeared for the noticed trial. (R. 656-657; R.
1075: 1-37.) The Trial Court asked Appellant to explain why the Court should grant his
November 16, 2012 motion to vacate the trial date. (R. 1075: 7.) Appellant cited an issue

(''',
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with not knowing the "real party in interest" (R. 107 5: 7) and "the registration of the
parties with the Department of Commerce" (R. 1075: 5, 1. 20-21) and the "assumed
names of the parties." (R. 1075: 10.)

The Court clarified that "those issues were all

raised in the form of [Appellant's] Counterclaim and that Counterclaim was dismissed
several months ago." (R. 1075: 6).
The Trial Court then noted that the only pending motion was the Appellant's
motion to vacate the trial date. (R. 1075: 12). The Trial Court considered the motion and
observed that Appellant essentially asked for more time to conduct discovery. (R. 107 5:
12.) The Trial Court noted that the case had been pending for months and he did not see
any effort by Appellant to engage in discovery up to that point. (R. 1075: 12.)
Appellant argued that it was not his burden to propound discovery, asserting that
Respondent was required to provide him with discovery 14 days after Respondent's
3

There was only one defendant in the unlawful detainer action, Appellant William York.
7

answer. The Trial Court clarified that the requirement was for initial disclosures. (R.
1075: 12). Appellant then acknowledged that he received discovery documents from
Respondent on November 14th , 16th and 20 th (R. 1075: 13.) The Trial Court asked
Appellant what he considered the appropriate resolution to the allegedly late discovery
and Appellant answered that he needed time because he was "trying to determine who the
real party in interest is." (R. 1075: 13-15.) The Trial Court reminded Appellant that the
discovery he sought concerned the counterclaims already dismissed. (R. 107 5: 15.)
Appellant argued that Utah statute required entities to register assumed business
names with the Secretary of State, or they were precluded from accessing the Courts,
asserting this theory was a possible defense to the Eviction Action. (R. 1075: 16.) The
Trial Court advised Appellant that the assumed name issue might be an argument to
address at trial but it was not a reason for the Court to delay the trial. (R. 1075: 17-18.)
Appellant continued with his claim that he did not know who the real party in
interest was and the Trial Court asked, "In this lawsuit, who is the 'they' you're referring
to?" and, in circular fashion, Appellant responded, ''the real party interest." (R. 1075: 18.)
The Trial Court asked if there was any other basis for not having a trial that day. (R.
1075: 20.) Appellant responded, "It has to do with who owns this," which was once
again, non-responsive to the Trial Court's question. (R. 1075: 21.)
The Trial Court then asked Respondent about the discovery it provided to
Appellant, which pursuant to the Trial Court's November 13, 2012 Order had to be
provided seven calendar days prior to trial, which would have been November 14, 2012.
Respondent explained that it sent discovery documents out on November 14, 2012 and
8

did its best to comply with the deadline. (R. 107 5: 22 - 23.) The Trial Court agreed there
was a problem with the seven days issue but noted that, "my order was on the 13 1\ they

~

were mailed on the 14th , I think [Respondent] did [its] best to try to comply in the
compressed amount of time." (R. 1075: 24.) The Court then held,
"I do find that under Rule 26[,] initial disclosures were not made other than
those documents that were attached to the Complaint. I do find that any
document attached to the Complaint can constitute an initial disclosure. I do
find that the [Appellant] has had ample time to conduct any discovery he
needs with regards to the issues he's raised as he's couched it[,] as to who
the real party in interest is. He could have initiated his discovery last
spring. He failed to do so last summer and here we are in the middle of
fall. No efforts have been made."
(R. 1075: 25-26)(emphasis added). The Trial Court continued,
"This is essentially a very simple question. This is an eviction action. It's
not a title dispute, although those issues were raised in a counterclaim,
cross-complaint-type pleading. Those issues have been dismissed The only
question before this Court today is the eviction question. In eviction
actions there are two expedited methods of having trial. Neither of those
require[s] the type of disclosure and time requests that the [Respondent] is
asking for ...
. . .In an eviction action it's very common that those are heard within weeks,
if not within a month or so of the day the complaint is filed. In this
particular case we've now gone through at least nine months before getting
into the eviction hearing."
(R. 1075: 25-26) (emphasis added).
The Trial Court held that because only limited initial disclosures were made, if the
Appellant wanted to proceed with trial that day, the Trial Court would limit Respondent's
exhibits to those attached to the Complaint. (R. 1075: 27.) Respondent noted that the
exhibits attached to the Complaint should be enough to go forward on the Eviction

9

"

Action. (R. 107 5: 25.) The Trial Court gave both parties the opportunity to consider how
they wanted to proceed, either with limited evidence or a rescheduled trial. (R. 107 5: 27.)
After the Trial Court took a recess to let the parties consider how to proceed, the
Trial Court resumed the hearing and the parties indicated they wanted to continue the trial
to a later date. (R. 1075: 28-29.) The Trial Court agreed and set the trial for December
12, 2012. (R. 1075: 29.) The Trial Court indicated that all disclosures must be made by
November 29, 2012 (R.1075: 29) and witness lists must be exchanged no later than
December 7, 2012 (R. 1075: 32.) The Trial Court declared that it would not consider any
further discovery or any continuance for further discovery. (R. 1075: 33.) Lastly, the
Trial Court advised that the only thing relevant to the Court were the issues related to
eviction, not any of the issues that were raised in Appellant's Counterclaim because the
eviction was the only matter not already resolved. (R. 1075: 33.)
D.

Appellant Raised the Same Discovery Issues Regarding Ownership in a
Motion for Discovery Sanctions but the Trial Court Did Not Find
Sanctionable Conduct

Despite the Trial Court's efforts to narrow the issues for trial, on December 11,
2012, Appellant filed three additional motions: a motion to vacate the order striking
defendant's amended counter-claim (R. 711-717), a motion to vacate the order of
dismissal of defendant's counter claim-civil complaint (R.718-720) and a Rule 26, 37 and
41 motion for sanctions (the "Rule 26 Motion.") (R. 721-747). The Rule 26 Motion
argued that the penalty for failure to provide initial disclosures was to preclude the
evidence not disclosed (R. 721-74 7), which was one of two options the Trial Court gave
the parties at the hearing on November 21, 2012. (R. 1075: 27.)
10

On December 12, 2012, in considering the Rule 26 Motion, the Trial Court
carefully discussed the timeline of initial disclosures, pretrial disclosure and the exchange
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of witness information with the parties. (R. 1076: 7-23.) The Court concluded and both
parties acknowledged that Respondent did not issue the initial disclosures as
contemplated by Rule 26 but that a witness list and exhibit list were sent to Appellant on
November 29, 2012 and that documents were disclosed on November 13, 2012,
November 14, 2012 and November 29, 2012. (R. 1076: 13.) The Trial Court noted again
that on November 21, 2012, it found that Rule 26 initial disclosures were not made other
than the documents attached to the Complaint but that those documents could constitute
initial disclosures. (R. 1076: 16.) The Trial Court informed Appellant that in the nine
months the case was pending he had ample time to conduct discovery regarding the
issues he raised as to "the real parties in interest." (R. 1076: 17 .) He could have initiated
discovery, could have pursued a sanctions hearing, he could have moved for an order
compelling disclosure, but he did none of those things. (R. 1076: 17.) The Trial Court
noted that arguing the alleged Rule 26 violation at trial was untimely. (R. 1076: 18.)
The Trial Court asked Appellant what Appellant thought was the appropriate
remedy to resolve the Rule 26 Motion. (R. 1076: 18). In Response, Appellant read Rule
26 aloud to the Trial Court. (R. 1076: 18-19.) The Trial Court asked, "So, again, I ask
you[,] what is the relief you're asking for?" (R. 1076: 19.) Appellant responded that
Respondent shouldn't be able to use any of its witnesses or exhibits. (R. 1076: 19.) The
Trial Court observed that the documents were disclosed to Appellant approximately two
weeks prior to December 12, 2012. (R. 1076: 20.) The Trial Court articulated that
11
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eviction matters are generally expedited hearings and many are resolved within ten days
to two weeks to a month, so the standard Rule 26 timeline does not necessarily apply to
an eviction. (R. I 076: 20.)
The Trial Court acknowledged that although the Rule 26 standards did not
necessarily apply to the eviction, Appellant had the right to the information in a timely
fashion before a hearing. (R. 1076: 20.)

However, the Trial Court explained that

Appellant had the information sought by mid-November, and as it was currently
December, there had been adequate time of at least two weeks for Appellant to review the
information and prepare for the trial. (R. 1076: 20-23.) Despite this, the Trial Court
indicated it was willing to consider excluding some evidence based on Appellant's Rule
26 Motion, but wanted to know what [discovery] efforts Appellant made over the past
two weeks that did not relate to the issue of the identity of the "true party in interest." (R.
1076: 23.) After discussion between Appellant and the Trial Court, it was clear that none
of Appellant's discovery efforts over the previous two weeks related to the issue of right
of possession, which was the issue for trial. (R. 1076: 23-27.)
The Trial Court reiterated that the issues the Trial Court would consider at trial
included only: (1) was the Appellant given notice to remove himself from the Property,
(2) did he fail to remove himself, and (3) did he have justification for remaining other
than a question about Respondent's title, which was not a pertinent issue at this juncture
because it had been resolved by dismissal of Appellant's Counterclaim. (R. 1076: 24-26.)
The Trial Court held that proceeding with trial was appropriate as Appellant had
had at least two weeks of notice regarding whom Respondent intended to call as
12

witnesses and what documents Respondent intended to present at trial in addition to the
documents Respondent attached to its Complaint (R. 1076: 26.)
E.

At Trial Respondent Proved its Prima Facie Case with Documentary
and Testimonial Evidence, which Appellant Failed to Rebut

The Trial Court then held the eviction trial. (R. 1076: 26 -114.) The Trial Court

W

notified the parties that it would not address the Appellant's motions at the time of trial
but would consider the motions and any subsequently filed memoranda prior to issuing
its decision on the trial. (R. 845.)
At trial, Appellant proved its prima facie case of unlawful detainer because it
established through witness testimony including Appellant's, that Appellant defaulted on
his monthly loan payments pursuant to the Note and Trust Deed which caused the
property to be sold at a trustee's sale. (R. 1076: 30-37; R. 1076: 49-53.) Although not an

c;;;;

issue for trial, Appellant still proved that it owned the Property before and after the
trustee's sale. (R. 1076: 88-92.) Respondent also proved that on the date of trial, the
Appellant continued to reside unlawfully at the Property in question. (R. 1076: 28.)
The Trial Court, despite Respondent's relevance objections, gave Appellant great
liberty to question Respondent's witness regarding the alleged ownership issues related to
the Property and regarding the purported fraudulent loan documents but Appellant did not
illicit any testimony that Appellant did not own the Property or any testimony that the
documents were fraudulent. (R. 1076: 55-76.)
After trial, considering the evidence and legal arguments of the parties, and after
having ruled on Appellant's motions, the Trial Court entered a memorandum decision
13 .
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that Respondent was legally entitled to possess10n of the Property and a Writ of
Restitution should issue. (R. 845-847.) At the Trial Court's direction, the Respondent
prepared the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 836-839) and the
Final Order and Judgment and Order of Restitution was entered on October 16, 2014. (R.
984-986.) This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the Trial Court's determination that Appellant unlawfully
detained the Property.

At the Trial Court level, Respondent established all of the

elements required to prove unlawful detainer resulting from a forced sale. Appellant did
not articulate a viable defense to eviction prior to or during trial.
Rather than deal with the right of possession, which was the only remaining
relevant issue in this eviction matter, the Appellant mischaracterizes this case as one
about property ownership. However, in the ten months that this matter was pending prior
to and including trial, Appellant never produced relevant, reliable evidence that
invalidated the trustee's sale, and never negated Respondent's ownership interest in the
Property or otherwise contradicted Respondent's prima facie case of unlawful detainer.
Contrary to Appellant's claims, the Trial Court did not err in its thorough
consideration of the facts and its determination of the legal issues in this case. The Trial
Court reviewed Appellant's claim that Respondent lacked an ownership interest in the
Property and properly dismissed the claim for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), in addition to other bases. Appellant never satisfied his burden
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to establish that the Trial Court erred or that the error was so significant that setting aside
the foreclosure sale was warranted.
Appellant's Statement of the Case implies that the Trial Court ignored egregious
discovery violations through its denial of Appellant's Rule 26 Motion for sanctions. In
fact, the record demonstrates that Trial Court carefully weighed the discovery issues in
this case, with the expedited nature of the Eviction Action, and ruled on those issues
fairly and within the scope of its authority.
In addition to Appellant's misdirected focus on ownership of the Property,
Appellant incorrectly argues that the Property is protected by Utah's homestead
exemption. Appellant acknowledges that Utah property is subject to foreclosure if there
is a security interest in the property as a result of its purchase. Yet, Appellant makes the
self-serving and unpersuasive argument that Respondent fraudulently transferred the deed
of trust, which nullified the security interest, protecting the Property from foreclosure.
There was no evidence of fraud in the transfer of the Trustee's Deed and still, fraud
subsequent to loan origination would not nullify the loan itself.

Gd

His argument 1s

speculative, is a red herring and is not a basis to reverse the Trial Court's ruling.
There were no errors in the Trial Court's rulings in this case. However, even if
there was an error, the error was harmless. Appellant did not and cannot demonstrate that
the outcome of the trial would have been any different had the Court ruled differently on
the motions and the Trial Court ruling should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT

I.

The Trial Court Correctly Limited the Trial to the Issue of Right of
Possession of the Property.

As discussed further below, at trial, Respondent established its prima facie case for
proving an unlawful detainer. The Trial Court properly excluded Appellant's evidence
concerning the issue of ownership of the Property, because the Trial Court already
considered Appellant's Counterclaim challenging ownership and dismissed the claim.
Further, Respondent had never demonstrated that there were any grounds to set aside the
sale of the Property to Respondent.
A.

Respondent Established its Prima Facie Case of Unlawful Detainer and
Appellant Failed to Rebut its Case with any Reliable, Admissible
Evidence

The Trial Court correctly limited the issues at trial to the right of possession of the
Property based on the Court's application of the controlling unlawful detainer statute.
After Respondent established its prima facie case of unlawful detainer against Appellant,
the burden shifted to Appellant to offer a viable defense. Instead of rebutting
Respondent's case, Appellant admitted that he defaulted on the loan and remained at the
Property up to and including the day of trial, but did not offer proof of his right to possess
the Property. (R. 1076; 28-40.)
Utah Code § 78B-6-802.5 states that a previous owner, trustor, or mortgagor of a
property is guilty of unlawful detainer if the person: ( 1) defaulted on his or her
obligations resulting in disposition of the property by a trustee's sale or sheriffs sale; and
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(2) continues to occupy the property after the trustee's sale or sheriffs sale after being
G:.;·

served with a notice to quit by the purchaser.
Throughout the Eviction Action, even after his Counterclaim was dismissed,
Appellant tried unsuccessfully to argue that Respondent did not have an ownership

t~·,

~

interest in the Property and therefore could not foreclose. Proof of ownership is generally
not an element of an unlawful detainer action, particularly where ownership is refuted
based on an alleged defect that occurred prior to the trustee's sale. The Utah Court of
Appeals articulated the standard and the timing to challenge an underlying foreclosure
sale, "The proper remedy is to seek an injunction prior to sale, which allows a debtor to
challenge irregularities and protect [his] rights before the sale is completed and a trustee's
deed is executed and delivered to the purchaser." Reynolds v. Woodall, 2012 UT App
206,

,r

15, 285 P.3d 7 (quoting RM Lifestyles. 2011 UT App 290,

,r 15 n.

4, 263 P.3d

1152 (citing Harline v. Campbell. 728 P.2d 980, 981)).
Despite his admission that he defaulted on the loan and that he remained at the
Property after the sale, Appellant improperly attempted to challenge the foreclosure in the
Eviction Action based on ownership. Appellant cites several cases in support of his
erroneous claim that the Trial Court erred in excluding Appellant's ownership argument
but the cases are distinguishable. (R. 51; R. 188; R. 1076: 30.) In those cases, the
ownership issues arose from identifiable defects in the trustee's sale not abstract attacks
on the mortgage industry or arguments that the beneficiary did not own the note.
For example, Appellant claims that Capri Sunshine, LLC v. E & C Fox
Investments, LLC, 2015 UT 231, 795 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 1s a case that establishes
17
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ownership as a necessary element to unlawful detainer, but it is not in all cases. Both the
facts and the legal question in Capri Sunshine were entirely different than those in the
Eviction Action, and the ruling in Capri Sunshine does not provide guidance on point to
the issues raised in the Appellant's Opening Brief.
In Capri Sunshine, there were four liens on the subject property. Id at

,r 3. Both

the owner of the first two liens (the "Senior Lienholder" or "Fox") and the owner of the
third position lien (the "Subordinate Lienholder" or "Smith") held foreclosure sales. Id at

,r 4-8.

Smith sued Fox claiming that Fox's sale was invalid, the trial court agreed and

invalidated Fox's sale. Id at

,r

4-6.

Smith then recorded his deed and conveyed a

quitclaim deed to Capri Sunshine, LLC ("Capri"). Id at ,r 6. Capri served Fox with a 15day notice to vacate but Fox refused, claiming Smith's sale was invalid. Id. Instead, Fox
gave notice of its intent to foreclose and Capri requested payoff quotes so it could tender
the amounts due. Id at ,r 7. Fox provided payoff quotes that Capri contested. Id.
Capri then filed suit seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, claims for
accounting and waste. Id at

,r 9.

Ownership was a necessary element in Capri Sunshine

specifically because Capri questioned the Senior Lienholder' s payoff statements and
because Capri claimed Fox was a mortgagee-in-possession with a duty to collect rents
and because it allegedly failed to collect rents was liable to Capri for waste. Id at ,r 19.
In Capri Sunshine, the trial court would not set aside Fox's second trustee sale for
multiple reasons, including because Capri failed to allege that it actually offered or
tendered payment to cure the default on the senior liens. Also, because Capri failed to
establish that it had an ownership interest in the property entitling it to an accounting of
18

rents Fox received during its occupation or that it was entitled to a cause of action for
waste. Id at ,r,r 20-25.

c;;;;·

The analysis in Capri Sunshine centered on foreclosure bids, the rights to junior
lienholders to tender the amounts due, the sufficiency of an offer of tender and
accounting of rents, not the lienholder's standing to foreclose. Nor did Capri Sunshine
discuss the identity of the "true party in interest," or lack of standing to foreclose due to a
purported fraudulent assignment of deed of trust. The ownership issue was addressed
because Capri's legal arguments assumed it was the legal owner of the property during
the relevant period, including the cause of action for waste, which was distinct from the
cause of action for unlawful detainer. Id at~ 23.
Appellants cite the Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. Sundquist matter as controlling,
but it too is distinguishable from the instant case. 2013 UT 45, 311 P.3d 1004. In
Sundquist, the plaintiff argued that the trustee who conducted the foreclosure sale and
conveyed the property to the evicting party, FNMA, was not legally authorized to
conduct trustee sales in the State of Utah. Id at

~

2. Specifically, Sundquist argued that

Utah Code Sections 57-1-21 and 57-1-23 limit the power of sale to trustees who are
either members of the Utah State Bar or title insurance companies with an office in
Utah. Id. In the Eviction Action, Appellant's arguments regarding Respondent's
ownership interest in the property did not invoke Utah Code Sections 57-1-21 - 23 and
did not contemplate the trustee's authority to conduct a sale in the State of Utah.
Respondent established its prima facie case of unlawful detainer against
Appellant. Respondent proved that Appellant defaulted on contractual loan obligations to
19
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Ameriquest and that the default resulted in the trustee's sale on December 27, 2011.
Respondent further established that it purchased the Property at the sale. After the
purchase, Respondent sent Appellant a notice to quit yet Respondent unlawfully occupied
the Property past the notice to quit deadline. Approximately ten months passed between
the time Respondent filed its Complaint and the date of the trial. During that time
Appellant failed to articulate, let alone offer reliable and admissible proof, that Appellant
had the right to possess the Property.
At trial, the Trial Court allowed extensive questioning regarding the alleged fraud
at but correctly limited evidence related to the right of ownership. Appellant had ample
opportunity to flesh out that claim prior to trial and he failed. Therefore, the decision at
the Trial Court level should be affirmed.

B.

The Trial Court Properly Excluded the Issue of Ownership at Trial
Based on the Federal Court's Concurrent Decision Dismissing the
Federal Complaint with Prejudice and Appellant's Failure to State a
Claim in the Eviction Action Counterclaim

Appellant argues in his Opening Brief that the Trial Court found the issue of
ownership was irrelevant in unlawful detainer actions generally and never gave him the
opportunity to argue that issue. (Opening Br. at 13 & 15.) To the contrary, the issue of
ownership was raised concurrently in the Federal Court and the Trial Court. In both
courts, the claims were dismissed, among other things, for failure to state a cause of
action, and the dismissals mooted the issue of ownership. Appellant argued ownership,
but he failed to plead the ownership allegations sufficiently. Based on the persuasive
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Federal Court decision and its own examination of the issues, the Trial Court properly
excluded ownership from consideration at trial.
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(l) requires that a complaint or a counterclaim contain, "a
short plaint statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. See
Consol. Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc. 930 P.2d 268,275.
To the extent that Appellant's ownership arguments were premised on fraud, Utah
R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that a party who alleges fraud must plead all averments of fraud
or mistake and the circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake with particularity. At
a minimum, Appellant was required to plead the "who, what, when, where and how" of

~

the alleged fraud as well as the time, place, and content of the false representation, the
identity of the party making the false representation and the consequences of the false
representation. U.S. ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah, 472 F.3d
702, 726-27 (10th Cir. 2006).
At the time of the Eviction Action, the parties were also involved in federal

Q

litigation regarding precisely the same issues; Appellant filed the same "complaint" in
both courts. · In July 2012, the Federal Court dismissed with prejudice Appellant's
r:".\

I&

Federal Complaint, which was identical to the Eviction Counterclaim, Suit for failure to
state a cause of action based on the corresponding Federal R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The Federal decision was significant for the Trial Court because "interpretations
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules." Tucker v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, ,r 3, n.2, 53 P.3d 947, Utah's R. Civ. P. 12 is patterned after
21

the corresponding federal rule. Anderson v. Am. Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827. Moreover, the Utah Appellate Courts are unlikely to
overturn a trial court decision where the decision was tried in more than one court.
Callahan v. Simons, 228 P. 892, 896 (the Appellate Court will have less hesitation in
affirming the judgment if the case is tried in two courts and in both the facts were found
against the appellant's contention.)
Utah courts are also clear that mere conclusory allegations in a pleading,
unsupported by a recitation of relevant facts, are insufficient to preclude dismissal or
summary judgment. Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186, citing
See Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857, 859; Ellefsen v. Roberts. 526 P.2d 912, 915.
Moreover, dismissal is appropriate even in "those cases in which the complaint is
so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any,
is well disguised." Thus, even if the underlying allegations were true, if pleaded in a way
that is too confusing or ambiguous to understand, dismissal is still proper. Salahuddin v.
Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

In the instant case, Appellant's ownership arguments were far too ambiguous to
comprehend, let alone credit. In his Counterclaim and in his subsequent motions,
Appellant failed to offer any clear, reliable, admissible evidence that there was a
legitimate question about Respondent's ownership of the Property. Nor, did he offer any
clear, reliable, admissible evidence that Respondent engaged in fraud with respect to the
loan, the foreclosure or the eviction.
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Instead, Appellant offered unintelligible and unauthenticated portions of articles
and web pages that cut and pasted from the internet, and the Trial Court ruled that he was

Q

not entitled to conduct further discovery or present further evidence of that issue.
The Trial Court considered the issue in the Counterclaim and Amended
Counterclaim. (R. 21-132; R. 334-335.) Based on the inadequacy of his pleadings and
subsequent failure to produce evidence of lack of ownership or fraud, the Trial Court
correctly ruled that he was not entitled to further discovery regarding the ownership issue.
When Appellant pushed back, the Trial Court noted that the issue of ownership was
raised in the Appellant's Counterclaim, which was already dismissed, and the only issue
still before the Court was who had the right to possess the land. (R. 1076: 25-26.)
C.

Appellant Failed to Satisfy Appellant's Burden to Demonstrate that
Setting Aside the Sale was Warranted

The issue of ownership was properly disposed of when the Court dismissed the
Counterclaim, but even if it was not, Appellant failed to demonstrate that the trustee's
sale was defective. Moreover, Appellant failed to establish that the alleged fraudulent
assignment of deed of trust caused Appellant unjust and extreme harm. Therefore, the
remedy of setting aside the trustee's sale is not appropriate.
For example, in RM Lifestyles, LLC v. Ellison, 2011 UT App 290, 263 P.3d 1152,
RM Lifestyles, LLC filed an unlawful detainer against the Ellisons. The Ellisons argued
that the trust deed sale was void because the title company recorded the notice of default
before it was substituted as the trustee. Id at ,r 11. In its decision, the Court of Appeals
noted that it would not even consider the merits of Ellisons allegation about the notice of
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default because the Ellisons did not first meet their burden of proving that the alleged
irregularity affected their rights. Id at

,r

15. Citing Thomas v. Johnson. 801 P.2d 186,

188, the Court noted that "the remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale is appropriate only

-~

in cases which reach unjust extremes." Id at ,r 16. Moreover, "a party who seeks to have
a trustee sale set aside for irregularity, want of notice, or fraud has the burden of proving
his contention ... Defects in the notice of foreclosure sale that will authorize the setting
aside of the sale must be those that would have the effect of chilling the bidding and
causing an inadequacy in price." Id., Cf. Timm v. Dewsnup., 2003 UT 47,

,r,r 36-37,

86

P.3d 699, quoting Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159.
Appellant argues that he should have had the opportunity to attack the validity of
the foreclosure sale at the Trial Court level. (Opening Br. at 15). Appellant had the
opportunity to attack the validity of the sale, and did attack its validity, but failed to meet
his burden in two ways. First, as discussed above, his vague and conclusory allegations
about Respondent's ownership of the Property failed to state a claim and both the Trial
Court and the Federal Court properly dismissed his complaints. Second, Appellant failed
to demonstrate at trial that there was a flaw in the underlying trustee's sale that caused
him any harm, let alone harm that reached an unjust extreme. Ellison at ,r 16.
The Record demonstrates that Appellant was consumed by his belief that
Respondent did not own the Property. Yet, Appellant never proved that he had the right
to possess the Property or that he suffered harm as a result of the trustee's sale.
Ultimately, he defaulted on his loan obligations and the property owner - regardless of
who it was - commenced an unlawful detainer suit against him; the logical consequence
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of failing to make mortgage payments. There was no dispute that Appellant defaulted on
his contractual loan obligation and there was no evidence that a trustee's foreclosure sale

~

was an impermissible remedy to Appellant's default.
The Trial Court did not err when it limited the issues for trial to the right of
possession of the Property. However, even assuming that limitation was an error, the
error was not harmful because Appellant cannot articulate that the remedy he sought setting aside the sale-was warranted.
II.

Any Error at the Trial Court Level was Harmless Error.

Appellant incorrectly alleges that the Trial Court erred in its decision to iimit proof
of ownership arguments at trial and its decision to deny Appellant's motion for discovery
sanctions. For the reasons set forth below, both of the Trial Court's decisions were
proper and within the scope of its authority. However, even if this Court considers the
Trial Court's decisions erroneous, the errors were harmless.
The Utah Supreme Court has held numerous times, "Under both Rules of
Procedure and Decisions of Law, we do not reverse for mere error but only if error is
substantial and prejudicial." Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 369 n. 10 (citing Utah R.
Civ. P. 61 and Callahan v. Simons, 64 Utah 250, 228 P. 892). This principal is articulated
in Utah R. Civ. P. 61:
"No error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court ...
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or
order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."
25
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Moreover, in considering the appeal, the Appellate Court is to view the facts in the
light most favorable to the party who prevailed below. Ortega v. Thomas, 383 P.2d 406,
407. And, in order to justify reversal of District Court decision, the appellant must show
error that was substantial and prejudicial in the sense there is at least a reasonable
likelihood that in the absense of the error the result would have been different. Id at 408.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Respondent, it is clear that the
only issue in the Eviction Action was the right of possession and that belonged to
Respondent. The Record demonstrates that Appellant did not rebut Respondent's
ownership interest in the Property or, demonstrate that he had a right of possession. And,
even a cursory review of the two hearing transcripts shows that when asked, Appellant
could not articulate why Respondent allegedly lacked ownership or articulate who,
according to him, actually owned the Property. (R. 1075-1076.)
Moreover, Appellant did not offer the requisite showing of harm, because he
cannot demonstrate that the outcome would have been different if the Trial Court allowed
argument regarding ownership. Even assuming that the assignment of deed of trust from
Ameriquest to Respondent was defective - which it was not - Appellant still defaulted on
his loan obligation, triggering the right to foreclose and the Property was sold. (R. 2.) He
did not prove that he had the right to possess the Property. Appellant was not injured by
the Trial Court's dismissal of his claims and refusal to consider ownership at the trial
because the trustee's sale was a proper and foreseeable outcome of his default.
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Further, Appellant cannot demonstrate that the Trial Court should have sanctioned
Respondent by precluding Respondent's trial exhibits.

Respondent included the two

G;i

pieces of evidence it needed to establish unlawful detainer with its Complaint
approximately ten months prior to the Rule 26 Motion.

(R. 1-14; R. 1075: 27.)

Additionally, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Respondent, even if the
Trial Court precluded the additional testimony and exhibits offered at trial, Respondent
still would have proved its prima facie right to evict Appellant. Accordingly, any error in
this case was harmless and the decisions should be affirmed.

III.

The Trial Court Correctly and Within the Scope of its Authority Denied
Appellant's Request for Discovery Sanctions Based on the Expedited Nature
of the Unlawful Detainer Suit and Based on the Lack of Prejudice to
Appellant.
r.\

~

The Trial Court was within the scope of its authority to deny Appellant's Rule 26
Motion for discovery sanctions. The Trial Court carefully weighed Appellant's right to
disclosure in the context of an expedited unlawful detainer proceeding with the time and
type of disclosures Appellant received from Respondent. In light of the expedited ·nature
of an unlawful detainer suit, the Trial Court properly concluded that Appellant had
Respondent's disclosures, trial exhibits and witness lists with ample time to prepare for
the trial and sanctions were unwarranted.
Unlawful detainer proceedings are exped~ted as a matter of statutory law. Pursuant
to U.C.A. § 78B-6-810(2)(a), at the request of either party, an evidentiary hearing shall
be held within ten days after the defendant files an answer. One of the main purposes of
Utah's Unlawful Detainer Statute "is to provide a speedy resolution of the issue of
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possession." P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1020. Based on that intent,
unlawful detainer actions proceed on an expedited timeline.

Lincoln Fin. Corp. v.

Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102, 1107 ("the main purpose for having a statute providing for an
action in unlawful detainer is to provide a speedy remedy for the settling of disputes to
the right of possession of realty.")
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a) sets forth the scope and timing for initial disclosures and
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b) specifies the. appropriate scope of discovery in general and the
proportionality of the requests. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if, "the
discovery is consistent with the overall case management and will further the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of the case" and the discovery is "not unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative." Utah R. Civ. P. 2626(b)(2)(C) and (D). (Emphasis added.)

In light of this guidance, the Trial Court was within its discretion to weigh
Appellant's right to discovery with the proportionality of his request and the expedited
nature of the eviction proceeding. The Tenth Circuit has stated that, "determination of
whether a Rule 26 violation is justified or harmless is entrusted to the broad discretion of
the district court and a district court need not make explicit findings concerning the
existence of a substantial justification or the harmlessness of a failure to disclose."
Woodworkers Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir
1999).
The following factors provide the courts guidance in the exercise of their
discretion: (1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the testimony is
offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which
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introducing such testimony would disrupt the trial; and (4) the moving party's bad faith
or willfulness. Id.
Considering the prejudice or surprise to Appellant, the Trial Court acknowledged
that the Rule 26 standards did not necessarily apply to the eviction but that the Appellant
had the right to the information in a timely fashion before a hearing. (R. 1076: 20.) The
Trial Court explained that in a typical eviction a trial would be held less than a month
after the complaint was filed and if so, there would be no time for the parties to comply
with the requirements of Rule 26. (R. 1076: 20.)
In the Eviction Action, the Trial Court could not expedite the hearing because the
Appellant filed a Counterclaim which required lengthy motion practice. (R. 21-132; R.
353-513.) The parties were also engaged in the related Federal Action which impacted
the instant case. (R. 158-272; R. 323 - 330.) However, the Trial Court was able to cure
any prejudice to Appellant when it continued the original November 21, 2012 trial date to
December 12, 2012 for the purpose of allowing the parties to complete discovery and the
exchange of witness information with ample time to prepare for trial. The Trial Court
attempted to prevent further disruption when it ruled that discovery must occur and
conclude no later than five days before the trial. Because Appellant had Respondent's
trial exhibits for approximately two weeks prior to trial, the introduction of that evidence
at trial was not disruptive or prejudicial.
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(F), the Trial Court also considered
Appellant's willfulness in conducting discovery prior to that date and the proportionality
of his request in light of its timing.

The Trial Court observed that Appellant was
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complicit about discovery because over the nine months prior to the original trial date,
Appellant never sought discovery. Trial Court noted that his mention of discovery issues
at trial was untimely but the Trial Court still offered the parties two solutions, either
proceed to trial with only the exhibits attached to Respondent's Complaint or continue
the trial for the parties to complete discovery. (R. 1075: 27.) The parties chose the latter.
(R. 1075: 28-29.)
Therefore, not only did the Trial Court rule correctly on Appellant's Rule 26
Motion, Appellant had the opportunity to obtain the relief requested - preclusion of
Respondent's witnesses and exhibits - on November 21, 2012, but he elected a trial
continuance. The Trial Court was within its discretion to deny Appellant's Rule 26
Motion based on the lack of harm to Appellant. Appellant has not demonstrated the
contrary and the decision should be affirmed.
IV.

The Homestead Exemption is Not a Defense to this Unlawful Detainer Suit

Appellant incorrectly argues that the Utah homestead exemption protects the
Property from foreclosure because "if there was a fraud in the transfer of the deed, then
the sale of the property would not be based on a security interest in the property" and the
Property would be "exempted from forced sale." (Opening Br. at 18.) This argument is a
non sequitur and is not a defense to unlawful detainer.
Pursuant to Utah Code 78B-5-503(3)(b), a homestead is exempt from forced sale
except for security interests in the property and judicial liens for debts created for the
purchase price of the property. Additionally, pursuant to Utah Code 78B-5-503(3)(d), the
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homestead exemption does not apply to consensual liens obtained on debts created by
mutual contract.
Moreover, Appellant improperly raised the issue for the first time on appeal and as
a purported defense to eviction. As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court
may not be raised on appeal and the homestead argument should not be considered. State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,

il

11, 10 P.3d 346, 350, citing State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313,

318.
The Property was not exempt from forced sale because it was sold due to
Appellant's non-payment of a secured debt based on the mutual contract the parties
entered into in 2004. Alleged fraud in the 2009 assignment of deed of trust does not
retroactively negate the underlying 2004 Trustee's Deed which was recorded against the
property as a security interest based on a loan given in 2004. Therefore, even if there was
fraud - which there was not - the fraud does not protect the Property from foreclosure
based on non-payment of the loan.
Appellant's interpretation of the legislative intent is flawed.

The homestead

exemption was not enacted to create a carve-out in which property owners could obtain
loans to secure the purchase of the property, default on the loan and then claim an
absolute defense in eviction based on the homestead exemption. That would result in
unjust enrichment to the defaulted property owner and unlawful detainer defendant.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Appellant's homestead exemption argument is no
more than a red herring argument and should not be considered.
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CONCLUSION
The Record clearly demonstrates that the Trial Court correctly limited the scope of
the issues for the unlawful detainer trial to the right to possess the Property. Appellant
had the opportunity to challenge the unlawful detainer complaint and argue Respondent's
alleged lack of ownership in the Property. However, Appellant's challenges lacked
credibility, were conclusory and did not create a viable defense to eviction.
The Record also demonstrates that the Trial Court was within the scope of its
authority when it denied Appellant's Rule 26 Motion for sanctions. At the time of trial,
Appellant had all of the information he needed to defend against the unlawful detainer
claims against him. Moreover, he had nine months prior to the trial to investigate, seek
discovery and hold depositions - much longer than most unlawful detainer defendants but he elected not to do so.
Reversal would only be appropriate if there was a substantial and prejudicial error
at the Trial Court level, which there was not. Therefore, the decisions at the Trial Court

level should be affirme_d}i_
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